

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 11456

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EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS
- NOVEMBER 29, 1977 (SALT TWO - 1515)

1. (PEREZ - SCHNEITER/SHCHUKIN, A-1908)

CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS:

SHCHUKIN SAID SOVIET SIDE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THAT TRANSPORTS USED AS CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS HAD A LIFT-WEIGHT CAPABILITY MUCH GREATER THAN THAT OF EXISTING HEAVY BOMBERS. SINCE LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS WOULD COUNT IN THE 1320 AGGREGATE, THIS RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH CARRIERS SHOULD COUNT NOT AS ONE, BUT AS TWO OR MORE. PEREZ RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS, IN THAT CASE, THE SOVIET SS-18 SHOULD COUNT AS GREATER THAN ONE IN 1320 AGGREGATE.

PEREZ NOTED THAT SINCE CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS MIGHT
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HAVE DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS THAN PURE BOMBERS, PARTICULARLY IF USED IN A STAND-OFF ROLE, US WAS LOOKING AT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. SCHNEITER SAID IT WAS LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD HAVE DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IF, IN TERMS OF CHARACTERISTICS, THE ORIGINAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DIFFERENT, WOULD IT NOT BE CORRECT TO REFER TO THE CRUISE MISSILE CARRIER AS

A NEW TYPE? SCHNEITER SAID POSSIBLY SO. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IF ONE APPLIED WHAT US CALLED THE TYPE RULE. IF ONE INTRODUCED CONCEPT OF AN INDIVIDUAL NEW TYPE OF CARRIER USED FOR CARRYING LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT WAS THE PROTOTYPE, THIS WOULD REMOVE THE PROBLEM. IN THIS CASE, IT SHOULD POSE NO DIFFICULTY FOR US TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE VIII, SINCE THERE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED THE CONCEPT OF A NEW TYPE OF CRUISE MISSILE CARRIER. INTRODUCTION OF THE TYPE CONCEPT WOULD ALSO EXCLUDE PROBLEM OF COUNTING CRUISE MISSILES ON AN AIRCRAFT-BY-AIRCRAFT BASIS, WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT. SHCHUKIN ADDED THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE B-52 BOMBER AND THE CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS SHOULD BE DIFFERENT ENOUGH FOR ONE TO SAY THAT IT WAS DESIGNED FOR THAT PURPOSE. IT WOULD NO LONGER BE A B-52 BUT, SAY, A B-53. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE SITUATION WITH B-52 G'S AND H'S. IF THERE WERE NO EXTERNAL FEATURES DISTINGUISHING B-52 G'S FROM H'S, THEN IF B-52 G'S HAD CRUISE MISSILES, NOT ONLY THE G'S BUT THE H'S WOULD COUNT.

SS-16 BAN:

PEREZ NOTED THAT US COMMON UNDERSTANDING RE SS-16 INCLUDED A COMMITMENT NOT TO PRODUCE COMPONENTS UNIQUE TO IT. WAS IT SOVIET VIEW THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ALSO
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INCLUDED SUCH A COMMITMENT, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT MENTIONED EXPLICITLY? SHCHUKIN ANSWERED, "ABSOLUTELY SO." HE STRESSED THAT SS-20 WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE SS-16, BOTH IN ITS WHOLE AND IN ITS COMPONENTS. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING NOT TO PRODUCE EITHER THE SS-16 MISSILE OR ITS COMPONENTS.

NEW TYPES:

SHCHUKIN SAID SOVIET SIDE BELIEVED LIMITS ON MODERNIZATION ESTABLISHED BY AGREED TEXT RE MIRVS, LAUNCHERS, ETC., ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT CRITERIA TO SEE THAT WITHIN THOSE LIMITS MODERNIZATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT. PEREZ SAID US CONCERN WAS PARTICULARLY WITH IMPROVED GUIDANCE AND ACCURACY OF WARHEADS, WHICH COULD RESULT IN IMPROVED CAPABILITY. US WANTED TO FREEZE SUCH CAPABILITIES. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT FREEZING ANY IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES (FOR EXAMPLE, GUIDANCE) FOR PERIOD OF PROTOCOL WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND UNVERIFIABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, TO TAKE A LIQUID-FUELED MISSILE AND TO CONVERT IT TO A SOLID-FUELED MISSILE IN TERMS OF MODERNIZATION WAS IMPOSSIBLE. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD RESULT IN A NEW TYPE. IN

PRACTICAL TERMS, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE CHANGES IN GUIDANCE SYSTEMS; IT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNVERIFIABLE. ANY MILITARY MAN WOULD WISH TO INTRODUCE IMPROVEMENTS TO HIS SYSTEM; THAT COULD NOT BE STOPPED. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN PRESENT LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT, THE QUESTION OF ACCURACY IS IRRELEVANT IN TERMS OF DESTROYING

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ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OR POPULATION.

2. (ROWNY/BELETSKY, A-1903)

NEW TYPES:

BELETSKY SAID EXEMPTION OF ONE NEW TYPE OF MIRVED SLBM PROPOSED BY US ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT FOR EXEMPTING ONE NEW ICBM ALSO. ROWNY REMINDED BELETSKY THAT ADDING SLBMS TO NEW TYPE BAN WAS SOVIET IDEA, AND WE HAD OFFERED SOVIETS AN EQUAL RIGHT OF EXEMPTING ONE OF THEIR SLBM SYSTEMS -- THE SS-N-18. HOWEVER, SOVIET DESIRE TO EXEMPT TYPHOON AND NOT SS-N-18 MADE A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF SLBMS MEANINGLESS.

BOMBER VARIANTS:

BELETSKY SAID THAT AS FOR COUNTING AIRCRAFT IN THE 1320 AGGREGATE, SOVIETS WERE SIMPLY TURNING OUR FORMULATION "HOWEVER CONFIGURED" BACK ON US. ROWNY COUNTERED THAT "HOWEVER CONFIGURED" PERTAINED TO CAPABILITIES. HE

SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS COULD SHOW US THAT THEIR RECCE
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OR OTHER VARIANTS DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF BEING
UTILIZED AS HEAVY BOMBERS OR CANNOT BE RAPIDLY CONVERTED
TO THAT PURPOSE, WE STAND READY TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE.
SIMILARLY, HE SAID, ONLY AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS
WOULD HAVE CAPABILITY OF LAUNCHING ALCMS. WE WOULD PRO-
DUCE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT OTHER AIR-
CRAFT DID NOT HAVE THAT CAPABILITY.

3. (NORTON/BEKETOV - JOURAVLEV, A-1907)

DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION:

NORTON ASKED WHY IT WOULD TAKE SOVIETS 18 MONTHS TO
REDUCE TO 2250 SNDV. JOURAVLEV SAID WORK WAS TIME-CONSU-
MING, FOR WHICH ONLY LIMITED NUMBER OF TECHNICIANS WERE
TRAINED, WHO ALSO PERFORMED OTHER NECESSARY WORK. HE
ADDED THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT WORKED OUT SCHEDULE FOR
DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION, OR DETERMINED WHETHER USSR
WOULD FIRST DISMANTLE/DESTROY MISSILES, BOMBERS, SSBNS, OR
DO SOME OF EACH SIMULTANEOUSLY.

HEAVY BOMBER VARIANTS:

IN RESPONSE TO NORTON'S QUESTIONS, JOURAVLEV SAID
TUPOLEV RECCE DOES NOT HAVE BOMB BAY SPACE OR CAVITY;
ALL THE SPACE WAS FILLED BY EQUIPMENT. HE SAID RECCE
HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY CONSTRUCTED FOR ASW MISSION, AND HAD
A UNIQUE DESIGNATOR, BUT US HAD NO NEED TO KNOW THIS SINCE
SOVIET SIDE HAD PROVIDED DISTINGUISHING FEATURES.

NEW TYPES OF SLBMS:

BEKETOV OPINED THAT FLIGHT-TEST IS LESS IMPORTANT
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MEASURE THAN DEPLOYMENT DATE OF SLBM/SSBN SYSTEM. RSM-50
WAS INITIALLY FLIGHT-TESTED IN 1975 AND IS NOW DEPLOYED
ON DELTA CLASS; C-4 WAS FIRST TESTED IN 1977 -- 2 YEARS
LATER. THE RSM-52/TYPHOON SYSTEM WOULD BE DEPLOYED ABOUT
SAME TIME AS C-4/OHIO SYSTEM, THAT IS, JANUARY 1, 1979.
IF NECESSARY, HE SAID, FLIGHT-TESTING OF NEW SLBM FROM
LAND-BASED LAUNCHER MAY BE CUT SHORT AND MISSILE TESTED
QUICKLY FROM A SUBMARINE. NORTON ASKED IF HE HAD UNDER-

STOOD CORRECTLY THAT RSM-52 WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN JANUARY 1979. BEKETOV REPLIED THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE EXACTLY THAT DATE, BUT WOULD "IN ANY EVENT" BE DURING PROTOCOL PERIOD.

COUNTING OF B-52 EQUIPPED FOR ALCM:

JOURAVLEV ASKED WHETHER EQUIPPING OF B-52 FOR CRUISE MISSILES WOULD MAKE IT AN AIRCRAFT OF ANOTHER TYPE? FURTHER, WAS US GOING TO EQUIP AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE B-52 FOR CRUISE MISSILES? NORTON SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH US WAS STILL STUDYING THIS MATTER, HE COULD SAY THAT EQUIPPING OF B-52S FOR CRUISE MISSILES WOULD REQUIRE CHANGES TO THE B-52, AND ONE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBSERVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE B-52S WHICH WERE EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES AND THOSE NOT SO EQUIPPED. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, JOURAVLEV SAID SOVIET SIDE CONSIDERED ALL THREE B-52 MODELS TO BE OF THE SAME TYPE, I.E., B-52. THEY WERE ALL FOR THE SAME BASIC PURPOSE: BOMBING. JOURAVLEV ALSO SAID FIRST SOVIET-PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II.3 DID NOT REFER TO B-52, WHICH IS HEAVY BOMBER, BUT TO OTHER BOMBERS WHICH US MIGHT EQUIP FOR CRUISE MISSILES. NORTON ASKED JOURAVLEV MEANING OF THE WORD "BOMBER" IN THIS AGREED STATEMENT. JOURAVLEV SAID HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY SURE BUT TERM "BOMBER" DID NOT INCLUDE HEAVY BOMBERS. NORTON SAID HE FOUND THIS CONFUSING, SINCE HE WAS TOLD PREVIOUSLY THAT IT INCLUDED ALL BOMBERS. (SEE A-1894.) JOURAVLEV SAID THAT WAS NOT WHAT THE TERM MEANT. JOURAVLEV ALSO CONFIRMED

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SOVIET COMMENT IN DRAFTING GROUP, THAT ALL 570-ODD B-52S

WOULD COUNT IN THE 1320 WHEN THE FIRST WAS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES. NORTON INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF IT WERE CONSIDERED THAT EQUIPPING OF A B-52 FOR CRUISE MISSILES MADE IT AN AIRCRAFT OF ANOTHER TYPE. JOURAVLEV SAID THIS WAS A NEW CONCEPT WORTHY OF STUDY, AND THAT SIDES SHOULD RETURN TO IT LATER. EARLE

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